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Abstract This paper presents an East–West endogenous-growth model that repro-
duces recent stylized facts applicable to the trade liberalization process of many
developing countries: convergence with the rest of the world, higher internal diver-
gence, increasing spatial concentration of economic activity and higher growth rates.
We claim that the ongoing reduction of manufacturing trade costs may generate a net
inﬂowofglobaldemandtowardstheindustrializedcoresofdevelopingcountries.This
will induce a reallocation of labor from traditional to modern sectors. In turn, such a
sectoral shift may enlarge the catch-up (imitation) potential of developing countries
and raise global growth rates, due to Grossman and Helpman’s complementarity bet-
ween imitative and innovative activities. Although advanced economies may become
relatively worse off, the effect on growth rates may allow them to gain in absolute
terms.
JEL Classiﬁcation R11 · F43
1 Introduction
China’s gradual liberalizationover thelastdecades isleading toarapidprocessof cat-
chup with more advanced economies. However, internal divergence has been rising,
with the coastal areas beneﬁtting much more than the more inland provinces. This
experience has not been limited to China. Though growth in Mexico has been somew-
hat more disappointing, its catchup with the rest of the world has been paralleled by
increasing divergence between the more advanced and the less advanced states of the
country.
This paper explores the impact of a developing country’s higher trade openness on
convergence,notjustwiththerestoftheworld,butalsowithintheliberalizingcountry.
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In addition to addressing these questions of relative development, it also analyzes its
effectongloballong-rungrowth.Thisisimportant:althoughtherestoftheworldmay
become relatively worse off, in absolute terms it may end up gaining due to the impact
of higher trade openness on growth rates.
Our modelling tool is an East–West framework with an exogenous division within
the eastern (and poorest) country. The East consists of an industrialized Core—which
can potentially host both manufactures and a research sector devoted to imitating
western patents—and a Periphery doomed to host just primary sectors under perfect
competition. We assume that international-trade barriers for our homogeneous (pri-
mary) good do not decay at the same pace as those of manufactures, as if biased
technological change was affecting differently the transaction costs of both sectors.1
Sincethewesternaggregateincomeislarger,anincreaseinmanufacturingtradeopen-
nessinducesanetinﬂowofdemandforeasternvarieties,whichraisestherelativewage
of the Core with respect to the West. Simultaneously, the relative wage of the Core
withrespecttothePeripheryalsorises,sinceprimarygoodsremainbarelyasattractive
to foreign consumers as before. Then, these widening income differentials within the
East give rise to Periphery-Core migrations, which also enhances peripheral wages
and favors East-West convergence. However, wages in the Core do not necessarily
decay with migration, since some of the immigrants will become researchers, enlar-
ging the eastern imitation potential and the fraction of world manufactures produced
in the Core, which channels an even higher world demand towards the latter location.
As for its effects on growth, the agglomeration of labor in the Core turns out to
be beneﬁcial for global growth rates. In our framework imitation and innovation are
complementary activities, which implies that a higher eastern catch-up potential spurs
innovation in the West. The last effect holds because stronger imitation will reduce
western wages and subsequently increase the value of a patent, raising the natural
incentives to innovate. Taking all this into account, any restriction to Periphery-Core
migration proves to be harmful in terms of steady-state growth, but not necessarily in
terms of regional cohesion, since a higher catch-up potential in the Core may boost
internal divergence patterns in the East.
The participation of China in the world trade and investment systems involves not
only crucial consequences for the internal disparities within that country, but also for
the international relocation of signiﬁcant labor-intensive industries, which often shift
from more developed towards less developed countries. For example, as illustrated by
Woo (2003), “in mid-2003, the electronic and electrical ﬁrms in Penang, Malaysia,
employed 17% fewer workers than in 2000”. Meanwhile, Mexico’s economic libera-
lization and trade integration in NAFTA has also been related to (internal) regional
divergence and the threat of a “giant sucking sound” posed for some segments of the
US economy. Well known empirical work has already estimated a signiﬁcant effect of
international trade openness on higher growth and increasing regional inequality for
these countries (see e.g. Wei 1993; Rodríguez-Pose and Sánchez-Reaza 2002).
However,thestudyoftheconnectionsbetweentradeopenness,growthandregional
inequality in developing countries had remained at a largely statistical level up to
1 For an empirical study that conﬁrms this tendency, linked to the recent breakthrough of telecommunica-
tions, see Rauch (1999).
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very recent times (see, e.g., Jian et al. 1996; Ying 1999; Kanbur and Zhang 2001;
Fujita and Hu 2001; Huang et al. 2003). Just a few papers have tried to introduce
some speciﬁc economic modeling into the debate on the sources of inequality. We
will brieﬂy examine the explanations proposed (Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Giannetti
2002; Hu 2002). Moreover, since our framework is derived from the Grossman and
Helpman (1991) model, our main innovation, compared to them, consists of explicitly
incorporating trade costs in the model. We also portray a dual economy within the
East, which allows us to modify the steady-state growth rate as trade shocks affect
differentlyourtwoeasternregionsandinducemigratoryﬂowstowardstheareaswhere
imitation takes place.
Focusing on the case of Mexico, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) link rising wage
inequality to the foreign capital inﬂows that followed NAFTA, positively correlated
withthedemand forskilledlabor.Ourmodel doesnotrelyonFDIastheusualsuspect
behind regional divergence, since our main driving force is a fall in manufacturing
trade costs, which shifts world demand towards the small economies once they are
sufﬁciently opened to international trade. On the other hand, Giannetti (2002)d e v e -
lops an East–West endogenous-growth model inspired by similar EU stylized facts
(international convergence accompanied by divergence within countries). However,
gradual increases in trade openness are not the main driving force of the mechanism.
Instead, strong regional disparities originate from international knowledge-spillovers,
which determine regional comparative advantage and subsequent productive speciali-
zation. Finally, Hu (2002) is also an economic geography model, inspired by the case
of China, but it does not model explicitly the Western economy and neither does it
consider growth effects. The only difference in his model between the Coastal and the
Interior region is a differential access to the Western market, without further institu-
tional distinctions. The presence of vertical linkages and rural–urban migration also
lead to agglomeration in the Coast as international trade costs fall. Nevertheless, our
imitation-potential mechanism is absent from his model, which leads him to support
the traditional view on the pro-convergence effects of interregional migration.
It is important to note that our results crucially depend on the Periphery being
exogenously a rural economy, radically differentiated from the rest of the East concer-
ning productive capabilities. However, we argue that—at least in the case of China—
suchageo-economicstructureisnotendogenouslyderivedfromthetypicalinterplayof
centripetal and centrifugal forces, as described by a Core-Periphery model in a market
economy.Instead,theycomefromthedeliberatedecisionsmadebyabodyofpolitical
authorities,whofaceatrade-offbetweentheirownobjectivesandthoseofthecommon
population. In other words, we are going to argue in favor of the political-economy
origins of the economic backwardness of Central and Western China, as opposed to
alternative economic-geography motivations, like those modeled, for example, by Hu
(2002). Therefore, this paper intends to describe the mechanism by which current
regional disparities are aggravated, but renounces to study the underlying rationale
behind the Core’s specialization in manufactures and the peripheral specialization in
the provision of energy, minerals, food or cheap labor.





the most solid conclusions they reached during some discussions with ﬁrm managers
was that, to some degree, most foreign-invested enterprises compete with state-owned
ﬁrms.Thesecondconclusionisthat“theChinesegovernment,bothnationalandlocal,
isacutelyawareofthatcompetition,andhastakenstepstoimpedetheabilityofforeign
ﬁrms to compete in the Chinese market”. Accordingly, multinational executives have
found related restrictions on their operations, e.g. export requirements, localization
requirements, restrictions on domestic market access, requirements for technology
transfer, ...Therefore, foreign-invested ﬁrms have mostly located along the coastal
area “following a line of least resistance”( Gipouloux 1998), i.e. FDI increases where
there are fewer state-owned companies involved in industrial organization. In this
respect, we reproduce a signiﬁcant paragraph from his text:
“With a jolt, the opening up of the country and the dynamics of economic reform
re-activated these divisions between coastal China and inland China, but they are
simply the traces of very ancient geo-economic dividing lines, still visible after having
been blurred for three decades (1949–1979), from the Communists’ takeover to the
beginning of the reforms. The 14 coastal cities that were opened in 1984 correspond
essentially to the chain of ports opened under diplomatic and military pressure after
the Opium Wars.”2
Thatis,thereissomethingmuchdeeperthanasimple“home-marketeffect”keeping
those divisions in place.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the properties of a
generic steady state, which initially shows a given distribution of populations in West,
Core and Periphery. Section 3 contains the comparative-statics exercise (in the level
of international trade openness) that reproduces our stylized facts, while allowing for
interregional migration within the East. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model without migration
2.1 Environment
2.1.1 Overview
In our framework, Periphery-Core migration will be responsible for the scale effects
thatyieldhigherglobalgrowthrates.Oursteadystatewillbecharacterizedbytheinter-
sectionoftwocurves:oneofthemdescribestherelativewageoftheCorewithrespect
to the Periphery for a given distribution of eastern population between both locations;
2 TherehavebeensincereattemptsfromtheChineseauthoritiestoswitchfromanuneven-national-priority
strategy to a nation-wide implementation of FDI promotion. However, as Chunlai (1997a,b) reports, “not
only has the process of diffusion from the coastal region to the inland areas been slow, but also the outﬂow
of skilled workers, technical personnel and capital from the inland areas to the coastal regions has been
increasing. Perhaps, more important is that the coastal region has been getting more freedom in economic
decision making from the central government than the inland regions”.
3 For a discussion on the highly distorted system of inland China’s industrial relations, see e.g. Young
(2000).
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thesecondone,alsoknownasthe“migrationfunction”,describestheamountofpopu-
lation willing to live in the Periphery for a given relative wage. Now we will derive
the ﬁrst of both curves, which implies solving the whole dynamic model regardless of
the migration decision, which will be considered in Sect. 3.
2.1.2 Endowments
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), we consider 2 countries—East and West. One
important novelty is the existence of three regions, i.e. we also include a Periphery
within the East. The population of both countries is exogenously given (being Ls
for the East and Ln for the West), since we do not allow for international migration.
Nevertheless,therecanbemigrationswithintheEast,whichmeansthateasternpeople
canmovefromPeripherytoCore(andviceversa)inresponsetoeconomic-opportunity
variables; i.e. Ls = La + Lc, where La (the peripheral population) is an endogenous
variable.
The availability of factors of production is different across regions, since every
location has distinctive institutional features. There are three main productive factors:
labor, researchers and ﬁnancial capital. Labor can be employed in agriculture (in
the Periphery) or in manufacturing (in the Core or the West), and researchers are
exclusively located in the last two locations. Researchers in the West are used to
conceive new varieties (startups), whereas researchers in the Core can only replicate
the existing ones to produce them in the East at lower cost. Moreover, there is perfect
occupational mobility between local manufacturing workers and researchers, in the
sense that both have the same local earnings and are therefore indifferent between
both occupations. The distribution of the population in the West and the Core between
researchers and manufacturing labor will be endogenously derived in the model.
A household (or individual) from location k owns a measure βnk of western ﬁrms
and βck of eastern ﬁrms. The source of this ﬁnancial capital were the previous gross
savings of the household, which were used to ﬁnance the new manufacturing startups
producingintheCore( ˙ βck)ortheW est(˙ βnk).Whenallocatingtheirsavingstostartups
from different locations, consumers must take into account that ﬁrms from the West
will be imitated from the Core and drawn out of the market with some probability.
2.1.3 Preferences
Any representative household (or individual) k, living in that location k, maximizes
















t reﬂects the discounted utility ﬂow that household k expects to obtain from
period t onwards by acquiring manufactures (grouped into the composite X) and the
homogeneous agricultural good (A). On the other hand, the particular form of Us
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reveals the relative weight assigned to food and manufactures in the following way:
Us = Xµ
s A1−µ
s , where 0 <µ<1( 2 )
The composite of manufactures Xs is a Dixit–Stiglitz subutility function over the












where 0 <α<1 is a positive measure of the substitutability between manufactures
andx j (s)quantiﬁesthehouseholddemandforvariety j attimes,∀s ≥ t.Theseprefe-
rences imply that the individual appreciates the expansion of manufacturing diversity,
since utility will grow as expenditure is more thinly divided among a growing number
of varieties.
2.1.4 Technologies
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and
n = nn + nc (the addition of the measures from the West and the Core). This degree
of product variety expands over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the
local measure of manufactures enlarges the stock of public knowledge and reduces
future R & D costs. Grossman and Helpman’s local stocks of knowledge are equal to
n in the West—since all patents were originally made up there—and to ncin the core.
This implies that there are no international knowledge-spillovers.
Theproductionfunctionforeveryparticularmanufacture(andforthehomogeneous
primary good) is identical and very simple: 1 unit of labor generates 1 unit of ﬁnal
output. Labor is the only factor in the production of the primary good, whereas prior
to the production of any manufacture it is necessary to incur a ﬁxed cost (to invent or
imitate the corresponding patent), which is ﬁnanced by means of gross savings. By
free entry in the innovative (and imitative) activity, such a ﬁxed cost is at least equal
to the market value of the patent. This value decreases with the local stock of public












n stand for the number of researchers needed to imitate a western patent in
the Core and to create a new variety in the West. Our variables wa,w c and wn denote
the nominal wage in the Periphery, the Core and the West, respectively. Later we will
establish some necessary and sufﬁcient parameter restrictions so that imitation and
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patent, while western researchers do it to invent one from scratch. On the other hand,
we assume that our primary good is traded costlessly, whereas our parameter τ ≥ 1
introduces the classical iceberg-notion of international trade costs for manufactures:
it is necessary to buy τ units of that good abroad to consume 1 unit at home. That is,
we introduce manufacturing trade costs between East and West, but we assume away
internal trade costs within the East.4
2.2 Static optimization
Productiveﬁrmsmustdecidewhichpricestoquoteineveryperiodtomaximizeproﬁts.
On the other hand, free entry into the innovative (imitative) activity guarantees that
the expected stream of proﬁts for the startup is equal to the actual cost of innovation
(imitation).
Consumers in any location not only decide how much to save, which equity to
buy and which commodities to consume, but also choose their job (if they are not
in the Periphery, they become either manufacturing workers or researchers) and their
location of residence. The job decision is not problematic, since they will receive the
local wage no matter whether they do research or not. On the contrary, as is usual
in economic geography, we assume that expectations are adaptive when an eastern
household chooses whether to migrate or not, i.e. they do not expect other households
to move at the same time.
The function Wk
s is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate argu-
ments (x j(s),∀j,∀s ≥ t; A(s) ∀s ≥ t) at every period t, taking as given the expected
temporal paths vn (s),v c (s),n(s), pj (s)∀j and pa (s),∀s ≥ t. As Grossman and
Helpman do, this problem can be decomposed into two parts:
– The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure Ek
s among the primary
good and all kind of manufactures, which gives rise to a demand function for each
of these commodities.
– The choice of an optimal path for Ek
s, given the possibility of saving and investing
in equity of eastern and western ﬁrms.
We will proceed now to describe the ﬁrst of both parts.
Let’s denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by γ the proportion of E
spent by people from the West, which is an endogenous variable. Considering that
demand for any variety comes from both western and eastern consumers who face
different c.i.f. prices, we can derive the aggregate demand for any western (xn) and
eastern manufacture (xc), taking into account (2), (3) and our previous deﬁnition of γ
4 Since those internal trade costs do not change, without loss of generality we can make them equal to zero.
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as follows:





























1−α. In expressions (7) and (8), as in Martin and Ottaviano (1999), δ =
τ1−∈ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) is a measure of trade openness in the global economy with respect
to manufactures.
Concerning ﬁrms, they maximize proﬁts at any period s taking into account a
demand of the type (7)o r( 8) and the simple production function described above. As
a result, both utility and proﬁt maximization from expressions (3), (7) and (8) result
in a common optimal price for all industrial ﬁrms in location k, which is a constant




, for k = West, Core. (9)







wkxk for k = West, Core (10)
On the other hand, we assume that the wage differential between West and Core
is high enough for eastern imitators to quote the unconstrained optimal mark-up.
Therefore,thiswide-gapassumptionwillonlybesatisﬁediftheoriginalmanufacturer
can not undercut the eastern ﬁrm without incurring losses, i.e. iff5
wc
α
τ ≤ wn (11)
Giventhattheprimarysectorischaracterizedbyperfectcompetitionandfreeentry,
the agricultural price is equal to the peripheral wage and per-ﬁrm operating proﬁts
are zero. We assume that international transaction costs for primary products remain
unaltered. So, without loss of generality, we state that these costs are just nil. Taking
all this into account,
pa = wa =




Now we have to face the intertemporal allocation of expenditure and savings, not only
to distribute consumption along the time horizon, but also to ﬁnance new startups in
5 This assumption is useful to rule out strategic behavior in the pricing decisions of western and eastern
ﬁrms.
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the West and the Core. In order to allocate expenditure and savings over time, any
household k must choose (in every period s) a variation in its portfolio composition,
buying or selling equity from eastern and western ﬁrms. During that process the
household needs to keep in mind that (in every period s) a fraction m = ˙ nc
nn of the
western measure of varieties is copied by eastern imitators, which implies that the
previous owners of those ﬁrms will lose their equity.
Letπn andπc denotethecurrentoperatingproﬁtsofanywesternandeasternindus-
trial ﬁrm, respectively. At every period s, a representative household from location
k owns a measure βnk (s) of western ﬁrms and βck (s) of eastern ﬁrms. Moreover,
fnk stands for the proportion of gross savings devoted to buying western equity. We
will explore the properties of an interior equilibrium in which new startups from both
countries are ﬁnanced (i.e. 0 < fnk < 1).
Our control variables are Ek (household’s expenditure) and fnk (s), whereas the
state variables are βnk (s) and βck (s). Then, the present-value Hamiltonian faced by
any household in location k at time t for the period s is the following:
Hk (s) = e−ρ(s−t).log Ek (s)
+ nk (s)
 






















































The last expression shows how, in equilibrium, the proﬁtability of western and eastern
manufacturing ﬁrms must satisfy an arbitrage condition period by period.
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2.4 Description of dynamic equilibrium without migration
2.4.1 System of differential equations
Now, by grouping terms, we can deﬁne A = E
nvn and B = E
ncvc. To characterize a
dynamical system in A, B and c = n
nc, we need to know ﬁrst the dynamic behavior
of the measures of manufacturing varieties, nc and n. We will follow the evolution of






by looking at the labor-market-clearing conditions. These equilibrium conditions in
the Core and the West can be speciﬁed considering the available production function









On the other hand, the system describes the dynamics of A, B and c, but the separate
evolutions of E, vc and vn can not be disentangled. As a consequence, Grossman and
Helpman have one degree of freedom to normalize
E(t) = 1, ∀t (20)








Instead of A and B, we will be interested in the evolution of the local nominal wages
wn andwc.Therefore, using(7),(8),(10),(17),(18),(19)and(21),wearereadytoset
upthecompletesystemofdifferentialequationsinwn,wc andc (whentradeopenness










































































n + (c − 1)w∈−1
c
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We will try to provide some intuition for the previous system of differential equations.
Let’s begin focusing on the ﬁrst equation: the ﬁrst term in square brackets contains the
increase in nominal wages due to expenditure. Expenditure will raise more nominal










next to the discount rate, and we can see that its absolute
value is decreasing in c = n
nc. That is, expenditure will make western wages grow
more the higher is c, i.e. the lower is the imitation-potential of the Core. This happens
because when the imitation potential is very low (c is very high), the expected life of
a western patent is high and the proﬁts offered by western ﬁrms in a given period are
consequently low. This encourages people to spend (instead of saving and investing
in western startups), which tends to increase nominal wages.
Let’s have a look now at the second term (in square brackets) of the ﬁrst equation.
Its interpretation is much more straightforward: western wages will increase more the
higher is innovation ( ˙ n
n), since higher innovation entails more demand for labor in the
West. And innovation will be faster the more researchers (and the less manufacturing
workers)youcanﬁndintheWest.Sinceahigherimitationpotential(alowerc)curtails
the western demand for manufacturing workers, innovation (and wages) in the West
will tend to go up the lower is c.
Therefore, inthe ﬁrstequation wecan seethat any variation inthe eastern imitation
potential (i.e. in c) has two opposite effects on western wages. On the one hand, as the
expected life of a patent is shortened by more imitation, people receive higher annual
proﬁts and therefore save more (and spend less), reducing the growth rate of western
wages. On the other hand, more imitation makes western workers shift to research
(rather than manufacturing), which raises innovation and spurs future demand for
labor in the West, raising the growth rate of nominal wages there.
Theothertwoequationsareeasiertointerpret.Thesecondjusttellsusthatwagesin
the Core will grow more the higher is ( ˙ nc
nc), since demand for labor will increase there.
The third equation obviously reﬂects that c is increasing in the speed of innovation
relative to the speed of imitation.
2.4.2 Innovation and imitation in steady state
If we prove that there are some values c*,w n* and wc*f o rw h i c h ˙ wn =˙ wc =˙ c = 0,
this will imply that there exists a steady state for our system of differential equations

























= (1 − α)
Lc
am
− αρ > 0( 2 4 )
We can observe that our innovation growth rate is exclusively determined by the
monopoly power, the discount rate and the imitation capacity of the Core. It may look
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rather odd that the global growth rate does not depend on the innovative conditions in
the West. In fact, this extreme result depends on the absence of international (West–
East)knowledgespillovers.OncetheyareallowedinGrossmanandHelpman(1991)s
model, it can be shown that both countries play a role in the determination of the
steady-state growth rate: what matters is that such a rate is always increasing in the
imitation capacity of the Core.







This implies that the value of every ﬁrm shrinks in steady state at a constant rate. In
other words, ﬁnancial capital depreciates at the rate of innovation, and it is necessary
to save to make up for that depreciation period by period. Now, from Eqs. (20), (25)
and also the arbitrage condition (17), we are ready to obtain reduced-form equations
for the proﬁts of any western and eastern industrial ﬁrm:
πn = (ρ + m + g)vn; πc = (ρ + g)vc (26)
Itisuseful,asGrossmanandHelpmando,toexpressc asafunctionofm and g,where
m = ˙ nc
nn is our imitation rate. Since m = g 1





As a consequence, from (4), (10), (19), (26) and (27), we can restate the arbitrage















= ρ + m + g (28)
Bycombining (24) and(28),wecan already derive aformal expression forthesteady-
state imitation rate m:
m =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






























⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(29)
As could be expected, m rises with the imitation potential of the Core relative to






. We can already establish a ﬁrst set of
parameter restrictions so that the global economy exhibits a positive innovation rate
and a positive measure of manufactures operate in both countries. That is, we want
that 1 < c < ∞, which requires 0 < m < ∞ and 0 < g < ∞. As we prove in the
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2.4.3 Absolute and relative wages in steady state
Now we will see how steady-state relative wages change in response to a fall in trade
costs. But there are still several endogenous variables to be determined that are crucial
for our comparative statics. Two of them are the relative wage of the Core with respect
to the West (ω = wc
wn) and γ.From Eqs. (7), (8), (9), (18), (19) and (20), we can get























We can see from the left-hand side of (31) that only the supply-side fundamentals—





Our term C(δ, Lc,ω)is a direct measure of the home-market advantage of one of
the countries to offer higher wages for similar supply-side fundamentals. The country




Lemma 1 In any steady state without net migratory ﬂows, any household’s expendi-
ture is identical to that household’s income period by period. Therefore, the steady-
state aggregate western and eastern incomes are equal to γ and 1 − γ, respectively,
and there are no net savings.
Proof See Appendix.    
Subsequently, let’s derive some formal expressions of western and eastern aggre-
gate income. An implication of the last lemma is that a household’s gross savings
in steady state just cover the depreciation of previously-owned capital. Therefore, a
representative household from location k will have an income








by that household. From (12), (20) and our deﬁnition of γ it is possible to come out





























In the denominator of (33), wn is an endogenous variable that has not been fully
speciﬁed yet in terms of the parameters. So, we need to obtain an expression for local

































In the next section, we derive a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for an increase
in ω in response to a marginal rise in trade openness (δ).
2.4.4 Comparative statics
Proposition 1 Concerning the distribution of ﬁnancial wealth, assume that
ηnnLn → 1−; ηcnLn → 0+; ηcc = ηca = 1/Ls (37)
where ηkl is equal to the proportion of aggregate wealth from location k owned by
any household living in location l. In that case, when the imitation potential of the
Core is sufﬁciently small, the relative wage of the Core with respect to the West (ω)
rises in response to higher trade openness if—and only if—the initial degree of trade








> 0 iff δ2 >
1−µ
µ
Proof See the Appendix.    
There are two opposite effects of a reduction of international transaction costs on
the relative wage ω. The ﬁrst one has to do with the difference in aggregate income
between East and West: a wealthier West will be likely to raise its demand for every
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eastern manufacture beyond the increase in aggregate eastern demand for any western
good. This would result in a rise of ω (and international convergence6) if there were
no other active forces. Let’s call this the relative-size effect.
But there is still another effect. Since most of the industrial varieties are initially
produced in the West, toughness of competition increases much more for the smaller
market in the East (a ﬁrm suddenly faces many more competitors there as δ falls),
which tends to depress ω and generate divergence. The strength of this price-index
effect decreases with the initial degree of trade openness (δ), since higher values of δ
imply that local price indices are almost identical to start with (i.e. the international
marketisalmostfullyopenfromthebeginning).Thismeansthatwhentheinitiallevel
of trade costs is already very low, the demand ﬂow is relatively more important, and
convergence prevails.7
Therefore, for dω
dδ to be positive we do not only need a large differential in the size
of both countries, but also a high enough initial value of δ. Under the assumptions of
Proposition 1, a very high relative-size effect has been guaranteed (since the imitation
capacity of the Core is inﬁnitesimal), which makes the initial level of trade openness
theonlydeterminantoftheevolutionofrelativewages.8 Inthisrespect,thisproposition
may shed some light on the determinants of protectionist policies: they may be more
likelytoariseinsmallcountrieswhenthecurrentleveloftradeopennessislowenough.
But we would like to know what happens to relative incomes also out of this
extreme situation, i.e. for any initial distribution of eastern population between Core
and Periphery. Our next objective will be obtaining the function ωc = wc/wa =
f (La,δ) that determines the labor-market-clearing relative wage in the East as a
function of La and δ. The intersection of this curve with an exogenous migration
functionωc = h(La),whichyieldstheamountofpeoplewillingtoliveinthePeriphery
as a function of the relative wage, will offer the ﬁnal-steady-state values (L*a(δ),
ωc*(δ)).
3 The model with migration
In this model, the introduction of migratory movements is the only way to strengthen
the catch-up potential of the Core and henceforth increase the steady-state growth
rate. Why are innovation and imitation complementary in this model? The answer is
twofold:
6 We will talk about convergence in this paper when there exists convergence in nominal income, instead
of real income or indirect utility. The reason why we adopted such an arbitrary convention is that nominal
convergence is usually the aspect detected by national accounts, given the difﬁculty to access good local
price-indices.
7 The distributional assumptions we make in Proposition 1 are just technical (simplifying) assumptions.
We can prove that it would be possible to distribute all world (ﬁnancial) wealth in a strictly egalitarian way
and the main result would not be affected. Furthermore, by making the Core’s initial imitation capacity
inﬁnitesimal we guarantee the relative-size effect, and make the price-index effect the only relevant force
in the comparative statics.
8 We have proved that the distributional assumptions could be relaxed while preserving our main result.
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– Firstly, as the imitation potential rises, the demand for manufacturing labor in the
West goes down and then ahigher proportion of thewestern population isdevoted
to research.
– Secondly,astheimitationpotentialincreases,theexpectedlifeofawesternpatent
shortens, which forces western ﬁrms to offer higher proﬁts (given the arbitrage
condition) and encourages more saving and investment in new startups.
And how can we get Periphery-Core migrations in the ﬁrst place? We claim that
such a Periphery-Core migration will arise if the Core is initially favored by trade
shocks. These results can be related, for example, to the Chinese experience: Solinger
(1995)andPoncet(2006)documenthow—despiteseveremigrationrestrictionsimpo-
sed by the government—the amount of “ﬂoating population” undertaking rural–urban
migration could reach 150 million people, and they are driven mostly by economic
motivations in the destination area. “Ofﬁcials say that by 2020 about 60% of popula-
tion will be living in cities or towns, which implies that more than 200 million new
people will move from the countryside by then” (The Economist, p. 29). For those
people, migration obviously has a cost. But this paper tries to shed some light on the
static and dynamic gains for those migrants, for the whole Chinese population and for
the rest of the world. Let us now face the foundations of the migration decision.
3.1 Migration
In this subsection we draw partially from Faini (1996) to obtain a microfoundation for
the migration function (ωc = h(La)).
SinceweassumedawayinternaltradecostswithintheEast,thepriceindicesinboth
Core and Periphery will be identical. Therefore, a comparison of local real incomes
reducestoacomparisonoflocalnominalincomes.Wewillalsoassumethattheutility
derivedfromagivenincomeintheCoreislowerthanthatinthePeriphery,whichmay
be due to congestion effects or undesirable living conditions in an industrial location.
That asymmetry will be summarized by the parameter θ( 1
1+(Ls/ρam) ≤ θ ≤ 1).
Wearegoingtoassumesomedegreeofheterogeneityintheeasternpopulationwith
respect to their willingness to live in the Core (summarized by θi, where θi measures
the willingness of individual i to live in the Core). That heterogeneity will show in a
certain statistical distribution of parameter θ among the Chinese people: in particular,
it will be assumed that θ follows a uniform distribution U[ 1
1+(Ls/ρam),1]
Sincewewillnotconsidermigrationcosts,theindividualwhoisindifferentbetween
living in the Periphery or in Core for a given ratio of incomes will be implicitly












where (1/Ls)ρamwc is the net ﬁnancial income received by any Chinese individual,
and ¯ θ representsthewillingnessofthelastindividualtomovetotheCoreatthecurrent
123International convergence and local divergence











And the amount of population living in the Core will be given, after some algebra, by
Lc = LsP
 






















i.e. the previous expression can be rewritten as




This is a decreasing and convex function in La, which shows the steady-state amount
of eastern population willing to live in the Periphery for a given relative wage. In the
next section we will spell out the intuition and details of our main results.
3.2 Description of dynamic equilibrium with migration
Since we want to reproduce some stylized facts, it is convenient for us to rule out
any price-index effect threatening to abort East–West convergence. Therefore, trade
costs should be initially low enough to turn demand ﬂows into the main result of
an incremental openness. Then, the relative-size effect will remain as the single dri-
ving force. Therefore, γ>1/2 appears as a natural requirement that (together with
δ−→ 1−) could be enough to achieve international convergence in per-capita income.
But let’s provide ﬁrst a sufﬁcient condition for γ>1/2 in terms of the parameters.
Lemma 2 Given our distributional assumptions in Proposition 1, limδ−→1− (γ) >
1/2 if Ln > ˆ Ln (Lc), where ˆ Ln (Lc) is a monotone increasing function.
Proof See Appendix.    
Aswecansee,itturnsoutthatinternationaldifferencesinaggregateincomeamount
to a difference in the size of populations. The larger is the size of Ln relative to Lc,
the larger will be the innovative capacity of the West relative to the imitation potential
of the East. This implies that a larger proportion of the global array of manufacturing
varieties will be produced in the West, raising the western real wage relative to the
eastern one.
The wide-gap assumption made explicit in (11) involves that limδ−→1− (ω) <α ,
from which we can also derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique upper-bound L∗
c ≥ Lc such that the wide-gap
assumption holds together with the coexistence of a positive measure of western
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and eastern manufactures; i.e. there exists a unique L∗



















the Core would be too high and the western ﬁrms would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undercut.
Our notion of steady state is partially characterized by the following equality:
ωc = f (La,δ) = h(La) (39)
where ωc = h(La) is our migration function.
Now we will endogenously determine the curve ωc = f (La,δ).F r o m( 12), (24)
and (36) we can obtain that
lim
δ→1− ωc = lim



































α (Ls − La + amρ)
Ln −
a(1−α)
am (Ls − La) + aαρ
 α
(41)
Here we can appreciate the two basic effects of a declining peripheral labor force
(↓ La) on ωc:
– First, the numerator and denominator of (40) directly capture the straightforward
labor-supply effect: if new immigrants come from Periphery to Core, ωc will tend
to decrease for a given value of Q.
– Secondly, the quotient Q(La,δ)
1+Q(La,δ) is decreasing in La because it reﬂects the gain in
imitation potential of the Core after an inﬂow of former peripheral workers. This
force tends to increase the fraction of the total measure of manufactures produced
in the Core, which channels world demand to this location and can potentially
raise wc.





a , Ls − L∗
c
 
. In fact, Q(La,δ)acts as a positive measure of the
















Fig. 1 Effect of trade liberalization
imitation potential in the core. Moreover, additional migration reinforces much more
that potential the lower Q(La,δ)is. In other words, once you have copied a high
proportion of western varieties, it is harder for you to raise your local wage by further
imitating: you have to compete—every time more toughly - with more and more
producers in your own location.






= 0 ∀δ and our function f is
continuous in La,we know for sure that f (La,δ) shows an inverted-U shape ∀δ. That
is, we can observe both an upward-sloping part of the curve - where the labor-supply
effect is stronger—and a downward-sloping one, with a dominant imitation-potential
effect9(see Fig. 1).
In Figs. 1 and 2 the horizontal axis measures the amount of population in the
Periphery (La), and the vertical axis represents the relative wage of the Core with
respect to the Periphery (ωc). We can observe in Fig. 1 how—due to the coexistence
of a labor-supply and an imitation-potential effect with opposite effects on ωc—the
curve f (La,δ)has both an upward-sloping and a downward-sloping region.
In order to draw our arrows of motion, we have assumed that agents form their
expectations in an adaptive way, as is usual in economic geography. This means that,
whendecidinghowtoallocatetheirﬁnancialcapital,individualstakelocalpopulations
as given and do not expect them to change; by the same token, when making their
migratory choice, eastern individuals do not expect relative wages to vary at all (even
when the economy is out of the steady state). As a result of this, we can see that the
system has two stable steady states and an intermediate, saddle-path unstable one.






















Fig. 2 Effect of Core-Periphery redistribution
The ﬁrst stable steady state concentrates all eastern population in the Periphery and
there is no manufacturing activity at all within the East (La = Ls). It is necessary to
haveacriticalmassofpopulation(andresearchers)intheCoretochannelasufﬁciently
high share of world demand towards that location and raise the local wage, which will
subsequently attract more population to repeat the cycle. If such a critical mass is
achieved, the system will evolve naturally towards the second stable steady state,




In order to replicate our stylized facts, we will assume that the economy is initially
situated in the second steady state (marked with a blue circle in Fig. 1) and it receives
a trade shock that will shift the f (La,δ)-curve upwards, as represented by the transit
from the red curve to the green curve in Fig. 1. That is, the main characteristics of
our relevant steady state are signiﬁcant agglomeration effects on the Core’s labor
productivity and a considerable labor stickiness within the East.
3.3 Main results
As anticipated above, the main results we need to reproduce are international (East–
West) convergence in per capita income, interregional (Core-Periphery) divergence
within the East, higher concentration of labor in the Core and higher (global) growth
rates. It may look counterintuitive the coexistence of potential Core-Periphery migra-
tions and interregional divergence within the East. The reason why both phenomena
coexist is that interregional divergence is obtained in terms of real income, but not in
termsofutility.Inthe sectionabout thederivation ofmigrationfunctions, weassumed
that people suffer from a congestion disutility in the Core (i.e. the marginal utility of a
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given income in the Core is lower than in the Periphery), and the parameter measuring
congestion disutility follows a probability distribution. As more people move to the
Core, the congestion disutility of the last mover becomes higher, and the ratio of
Core/Periphery incomes is also higher than at the beginning.
Now we will obtain a sufﬁcient condition for the ratio
Rca =
per-capita income in the core
per-capita income in periphery
to increase in response to a marginal rise in δ.
Proposition 2 Let Rca =
Yc/(Ls−La)
Ya/La bethecore-peripheryrelativeper-capitaincome.
If in the original steady state the following conditions are satisﬁed:( a )Ln > ˆ Ln(Ls);
(b) amLn
a < Lc < L∗













Proof See Appendix.    
Withasuddenriseinδ,thedominanceoftherelative-sizeeffect—whenweareclose




in the Core. This force countervails the labor-supply effect, which usually happens
when industrial competition within the core is soft enough and eastern labor force is
sufﬁciently sticky.
Given the signiﬁcant agglomeration effects on labor productivity detected in the
EU by Ciccone (2002) and in China by Au and Henderson (2006), accepting that
∂f /∂La < 0 (i.e. that we are on the downward-sloping part of the function f (La,δ))
does not look counterfactual. Neither does the extreme (interregional) stickiness of
laborinmanyEuropeanandAsiancountries(seeBentolila1997;FujitaandHu2001).
Let’s try to face now the East–West convergence issue in a similar fashion.
Proposition 3 If in our initial steady state am
Ln
a ≤ Lc ≤ L∗
c,L n > ˆ Ln (Ls) and
δ → 1−, then necessarily dRns
dδ < 0, where Rns is the relative per-capita income of
the West with respect to the East.
Proof See Appendix.    
Therearethreeforcesinvolvedinthecomparative-staticsevolutionofrelativeEast–
West per-capita income, two of which exactly offset each other. These 2 opposite
forces, whose joint effect is nil, can be described as follows:
– First, the net inﬂow of workers to the core enhances the innovation rate and,
consequently, also the demand for labor in the West, which tends to raise wn.
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– Atthesametime,althoughtheglobaleconomyinnovatesfaster,ahigherimitation
potential raisestheproportionofeasternmanufactures. Hence, alower proportion
oftotalﬁnancialwealthownedbytheWestexactlymakesupforthehigherdemand
for researchers in that country. Therefore, the only effect capable of modifying
γ comes from the aggregate demand for the manufactures produced in the West.
This aggregate demand goes down in terms of our numeraire, since the western
home-market advantage becomes weaker.
Corollary If in our initial steady state am
Ln





































Proof Straightforward from (12), (20) and the last 2 propositions.    
It is remarkable that—in our framework—a decrease in international trade costs
could be potentially Pareto-improving. This is true because both eastern locations
unambiguously gain in terms of steady-state indirect utility; and although the western
per-capita (nominal) income falls, that effect could be offset by the higher growth rate
for a low enough discount rate (ρ).
Furthermore, Fig. 2 shows how an intensiﬁcation of a Core-Periphery income-
redistribution policy within the East could reduce peripheral wages, wages in the
Core (due to the foregone agglomeration effects) and the growth rate of the global
economy10 (for an analytical derivation of this result, see the Appendix). Neverthe-
less, structural changes in the Periphery—even if ﬁnanced with transfers—could also
enlarge the scale effects within the East and yield both convergence within China and
higher global growth rates. However, this model does not lend itself to the study of
public investment (there are no public goods) and structural change, so we can not
assess quantitatively the relative virtue of promoting migration versus restructuring in
the Periphery.11
10 Therefore, the Hukou system may be having deleterious economic effects over China and even over the
rest of the world, although its implementation could make sense from a political-economy point of view
(see Solinger 1995).
11 De la Fuente (2004) creates a framework to study the optimal central-planner allocation of public
investment among regions, for a given degree of income redistribution that can not be extended. When
calibrated for the case of Spain, he ﬁnds that the allocation of public investment has probably been too
redistributive. His model is essentially static and does not consider pecuniary externalities across locations
or induced modiﬁcations in the local populations, as we do. If his model considered all these effects—
according to our framework—we presume that the case for redistribution through public investment in
Spain would be even weaker (we can not forget that this conclusion depends on the maintenance of a given
interregional solidarity through income-redistribution programmes).
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4 Conclusions
Wehave studiedanEast–West endogenous growthmodel whereexogenous institutio-
nal features play a major role: they determine the relative incidence of a biased shock
in trade openness on two distinct eastern regions. Within our eastern country, we have




a trade-off between Core-Periphery convergence and global steady-state growth. But
notnecessarilyatrade-offbetweenlong-rungrowthratesandEast–Westconvergence.
Ourmodelhaspotentiallyinterestingimplicationsfortheroleofinterregionaltrans-
fers. In particular, we conclude that, no matter how generous interregional transfers
are, if they do not help transform peripheral productive structures they can not prevent
an asymmetric exposure to trade shocks. If transfers also refrained migratory ﬂows,
they could reduce the core-periphery gap, though only by lowering all easterners’
labor income and the growth rate of the global economy.
On the other hand, if transfers were useful to industrialize the Periphery the scale-
effects would be larger. In fact, this seems to be the recent choice of the Chinese
authorities, aiming to reconcile higher growth and Core-Periphery convergence by
means of the setup of new economic infrastructure in the latter location. This looks
like an argument to advocate structural changes in the Periphery as opposed to direct
transfers to household consumption. But, in order to elaborate on this, we need to do
some welfare analysis requiring transitional dynamics and an explicit formulation of
bothmigratorycostsandstructural-changecosts,sinceweneedadifferentframework
to assess the relative virtue of promoting migration versus structural change in the
Periphery. This is an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix
Steady-state fraction of manufacturing varieties in the Core







































The trivial fact that n ≥ nc, i.e. c ≥1, imposes our restriction (30) on the value of the
parameters.
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Income-redistribution policy between Core and Periphery
We are going to introduce a proportional income tax accompanied by a lump-sum
rebate for the Chinese population. As will be shown, this form of Core-Periphery
redistribution will reduce the willingness of Chinese population to live in the Core.


















(1 −  ) + G (44)
where   measures the proportional income tax and G the corresponding lump-sum
rebate.
The balanced-budget condition that links the values of τ and G can be expressed
as
LsG =   [wcρam + wcLc + waLa]
Solving for G and replacing the value of G in (44), we can obtain an expression for ¯ θ
such as
¯ θ =
Ls (1 −  ) + (ρam +  Lc)ωc
ωc [Ls (1 −  ) + ρam +  Lc]





> 0i f f ωc > 1
i.e. within the relevant range of values for ωc, higher taxation implies an upward shift
of the curve h(La) and a lower steady-state population in the Core.
Proof of Proposition 1


















After a marginal increase in δ, the right-hand side of (31) has to remain constant,
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ω , it is useful to know the limit-value











































. As we can infer from (33), 0< δ
1−γ(1−δ2) <∞





+ ω = 0+ (50)









is ﬁnite, from (34) and
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> 0i f f γδ2 > (1 − γ) (52)
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(Ln + aρ) (53)




































> 0i f f δ2 >
1 − µ
µ
   
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof From our deﬁnition of Rca, our distributional assumptions (37) and Lemma 1
we can derive that in any steady state
Rca =
ωc [(Ls − La) + ρam (1 − ηcaLa)]
(1 + ρηcaamωc)(Ls − La)
(55)



















The assumptions of theproposition guarantee that thedenominator in(56) isnegative.
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Now, from (31) and (45) we can conclude that







δ→1− C (δ,La,ω) = 1 (59)





= 1 − 2γ<0( 6 0 )




























This positive sign means, by (56), that dLa
dδ < 0. And hence, from (20),
dg








































ρam (1 − ηcaLa)






















which means that limδ→1− dRca






. Finally, if we focus
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof Since Ln and Ls are invariant in our model, from Lemma 1 we can infer that
dRns
dδ < 0i f f
dγ
dδ < 0.
The easiest way to compute
dγ



















   
, and by






































am ∈ (Ln − ag)
(68)



















Apart from the assumptions of this proposition, expressions (41) and (69) ensure that
limδ→1−
dγ
dδ < 0.    
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Let ηnk =
βnk
nn and ηck =
βck
nc be the proportion of eastern and western equity,
respectively, owned by a representative household living in location k, where βnk and
βck are the absolute measures of western and eastern ﬁrms owned by that household.
Then, the amount of gross savings for any household living in k can be expressed as
follows:
(gross savings)k = GSk = wk + ηckncπc + ηnknnπn − Ek (70)




βjk − g = 0, i.e.
˙ βjk
βjk = g ∀j = West, core;










GSk (1 − fnk)
vcβck
= g (71)
123International convergence and local divergence
where fnk is the proportion of total gross savings devoted to the purchase of western
equity. Then, from (71), (4) and (28), we can easily solve for GSk:





wn + gηckamwc (72)
On the other hand, it is easy to see from (4) and (25) that the instantaneous variation










where Vk is the value of previously-owned assets by a household in location k. Since,
by (72) and the last equation, (net savings)k = GSk + ∂Vk
∂t = 0 ∀t in any steady state,
any household’s wealth is kept constant along the balanced growth path, i.e.






where yk is household k’s income, ∀k = West, Core, Periphery in steady state.    
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof From (33) we can check that
lim










− wc (Lc + amρ)
 
(74)
As we can conclude after inspecting expressions (24), (29), (35) and (36), condition
limδ→1− γ>1/2 can only be satisﬁed iff (74) holds. Now we just have to look for a
sufﬁcient condition that guarantees (74). From our deﬁnition of Q in expression (34),







































It is easy to see that ∂H
∂Lc ≥ 0 and ∂H
∂Ln ≤ 0 ∀Lc, Ln. Therefore, a sufﬁcient condition
for (74) follows from any situation in which H(Lc, Ln)<0. We want to search for a
relation between the initial values of Lc and Ln that ensures that H(Ls, Ln)<0 and
hence that limδ→1− γ>1/2 . For any initial value of Lc that satisﬁes (24) and (30),






















∂Q/∂Ln > 0 ∀Lc, Ln, then ˆ Ln (Lc) is an increasing function in Lc. Since
H(Ls, Ln) is a monotone and continuous function in Ln, from (77) we can apply
Bolzano’s theorem to state that
∃ a unique function ˆ Ln(Lc) such that H(Lc, ˆ Ln(Lc)) = 0 ∀Lc (78)
Finally, from the sign of the partial derivatives above, we can say with certainty that
∀Lc, if Ln > ˆ Ln(Lc) then H(Lc, Ln)<0, which means that Q < P and hence that
limδ→1− γ>1/2.    
Proof of Lemma 3






















⎦ ≤ α∈ (79)
Rearranging and rewriting (79) with an equality, we get the following quadratic equa-



















Since, from condition (30), Lc > 0 and Ln > a
am Lc −
aαρ
(1−α), we can conclude that
thedenominator oftheright-handsideof(80)isbiggerthan1.Thismeans thatatleast
one root L∗











because the right-hand side is positive and smaller than
αρ
1−α. Now we have to make
sure that L∗












If we formally restate (79) we can obtain the following inequality:
Z(Lc) = EL2
c + FLc + G ≤ 0 (81)
















































We can see that, in principle, the signs of E and F are undetermined but that of G is
clearly negative, which implies that Z(0)<0. Let’s explore now the implications of
the 2 possibilities concerning the sign of E:
–I f E > 0 then, since Z(0)<0,Z(Lc) is necessarily a quadratic function with
one positive and one negative root. Therefore, we know for sure that there is a
unique L∗
c1 such that Z(L∗











that this curve cuts the horizontal axis from below, conditions (81) and (30) will
be satisﬁed.
–I f E < 0, Z(Lc) will be now a concave function with at least one positive
root L∗












. In order to reject this latter possibility, it will be
enough to show that Z(am
Ln








imply that the other root is out of our interval.




































Again, since this curve intersects the horizontal axis from below, if E < 0 the wide-
gap case is compatible with positive measures of manufactures in both countries iff
am
Ln









To summarize, if δ → 1− , ∀am and a, ∀α ∈ (0,1),∃ a unique L∗
c such that both
(11) and (30) hold iff am
Ln









c is the smallest
positive root of Eq. (80).    
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